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Introduction
"Reduce non-wage labour costs, especially in Europe, by reducing taxes
on labour ...".
So says an OECD Jobs Study as one of its policy recommendations for the reduction
of unemployment.   As a further recommendation, it adds 1
"Reduce direct taxes (social security and income taxes) on those with low
earnings ...".
The idea here is to boost the relative demand for low skill workers.
The first recommendation is one which is often made.  Indeed commentators
point to the very high level of social security contributions faced by employers in
many European countries (over 40 per cent in Belgium, France and Italy, for example)
as being crucial to the allegedly poor state of the European labour market, including
its high unemployment.  However, a glance at Denmark - where employers pay no
social security contributions, non-wage labour costs are negligible and
unemployment is around the EU average - quickly reveals the weakness of this view.
Figure 1 shows why.  Here we see average unit labour costs (i.e. labour costs
incurred in producing $10 of value-added) in 13 OECD countries where we have split
these into wage costs and payroll taxes.  The figure shows clearly that there is no
significant relationship between unit labour costs and payroll tax rates, the slope of
a regression of the former on the latter being a mere 14 cents for every 10 percentage
points of tax, with a t statistic of 0.5.  The reason is that, in the long run, payroll taxes
tend to be shifted onto employees.
In fact, not only do non-wage labour costs tend to be borne by employees but
so do income taxes and excise taxes.  So shifting the tax burden from one
2type of tax to another is not going to have much impact on employment in the long
run as the cross-section evidence  reported in OECD (1990, annex 6A) indicates.  The2
only possible significant effect arises from the fact that income taxes and excise taxes
tend to fall on non-labour income as well as labour income whereas payroll taxes fall
only on the latter.  So a shift from one tax to another will change the ratio of post-tax
non-labour income to post-tax labour income, thereby changing work incentives and
hence unemployment.  This effect is likely to be small because the typical
unemployed person has very little non-labour income aside from benefits.  Thus, for
example, in 1987 over 50 per cent of entrants to unemployment in Britain had no
savings and only 15 per cent had savings of over £1000.  Furthermore, switching from
payroll taxes to income taxes, say, is a very complicated way of changing the effective
tax rate on non-labour income, given that it can be adjusted independently without
any difficulty.
To summarise, any attempt to generate a significant reduction in the
unemployment rate by cutting across-the-board tax rates on employment is likely to
fail.  There may be some short-run real wage resistance effects and some effects
because benefits are subject to income taxes but not payroll taxes.  But the former will
not last and the latter will be small.  So let us turn to the second recommendation
quoted at the outset, namely to focus tax reductions (or subsidies) on those with low
earnings - basically the unskilled. 
Why might this be a good idea?  The following arguments have been proposed.
First, because the unskilled have much higher unemployment rates than the skilled.3
Second, because the relative situation of the unskilled is getting worse, either on
account of technological change (e.g. Machin, 1994 or Berman et al., 1994) or because
of competition from the 3rd World (e.g. Wood, 1994) or both.  Third, because the
falling relative demand for the unskilled is an important part of the reason for the
dramatic rise in unemployment in the OECD over the last twenty years, particularly
in Europe.  
According to the first two arguments, any increase in the relative demand for
unskilled labour which can be induced by selective tax cuts would certainly improve
the lot of the unskilled and reduce their high levels of unemployment.  According to
the third argument, it might do more by having a significant impact on overall levels
3of unemployment.
Our intention in the remainder of this paper is to investigate these arguments.
In the next section we look briefly at why the unemployment rate of the unskilled
might be higher than that of the skilled, and how we might expect their relative
unemployment rates to respond both to relative demand shocks and to more neutral
shocks.  In section 2, we examine the facts - namely what has happened to relative
unemployment (and non-employment) rates, and wage rates throughout the OECD.
Then, in the final section we discuss the implications of these facts for the proposed
policy measures.  
1.  The Determinants of Unemployment Rates by Skill
Why might the unskilled have higher rates of unemployment?  There are a
number of straightforward reasons.  First, there is the obvious fact that the skilled can
do many of the unskilled jobs and during recessions firms can make use of this fact
to `hoard' skilled workers for the usual reasons.  The second related reason is that the
unskilled have higher turnover rates because their lack of human capital, particularly
of the specific type, much weakens their attachment to firms.  As a consequence they
have much higher entry rates into unemployment.  Third, their low wages ensure
that their unemployment benefit replacement rates tend to be higher than for skilled
workers, reducing their incentives to work.  Finally, any tendency for there to be a
floor on wages will raise the unemployment of the unskilled relative to the skilled
both by reducing the relative demand for the unskilled and by raising the relative
supply since the incentive to acquire skills is reduced.  Such floors on wages may
arise because of minimum wage laws, the activities of unions, the ready availability
of a given level of benefits or simply because some employers may find it distasteful
or indeed unprofitable to pay very poor wages.
A Simple Model of Sectoral Unemployment
To illustrate one or two further points let us provide a simple model which
follows that set out in Layard et al. (1991, pp.301-306).  Suppose output  (Y)  is
produced by a CES production function of the form
4(1)
(4)
(5)
where  1-D = 1/F,  F  being the elasticity of substitution.   N is the ith type of labouri  
and the  " parameters reflect productivity.  Assuming competition in the producti  
market, labour demand is given by
W = "N(N /Y)  = " ((1-u )L /L) X        (i = 1...n) (2)i i i i i i
-1/F -1/F
where  W is the real wage,  L is the labour force in the ith sector,  L  is the totali  i  
labour force,  u is the unemployment rate among type  i  workers and  X =i  
N(Y/L) ,  an aggregate productivity factor.1/F
Suppose wages in each sector are determined by a standard wage equation of
the form
W = ( f(u )X         (f′ < 0) (3)i i i
which may contain elements of labour supply, efficiency wages or union bargaining.
These equations immediately reveal the short-run level of unemployment for
each group of workers (i.e. for  L /L  given).  Eliminating  W yieldsi i  
so unemployment is increasing in wage pressure  ( ,  relative to productivity,  " ,i i
and in the relative size of the group.  Wages are given by
This short-run equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.
In the longer run, the size of each group  (L /L)  is not given because migrationi
occurs.  Such migration will tend to equalise expected rewards in each sector,
5(6)
W (1-u ),  relative to the (flow) cost of belonging to the sector,  (1+c ),  say.  So groupsi i i
in which  W (1-u )/(1+c )  is low will experience outmigration and vice-versa.i i i
The Impact of Relative and Neutral Shocks
Consider first, the impact of a rise in the relative demand for skilled workers.
Suppose, in the context of the model, there are two types of workers with equation
(1) having  " , " as the productivity coefficients of skilled and unskilled workerss u  
respectively.  Then we want to know the consequences of a rise in  " and a fall ins  
" .   In the short-run, it is immediately clear that skilled unemployment will fall andu
wages will rise.  The opposite will happen to the unskilled.  In the longer run,
however, the unskilled may respond to the additional incentive to acquire the
training necessary to become skilled (the rise in  u /u and the fall in  W /W ).  Asu s  u s
a consequence both relative wages and relative unemployment rates will start to
move back towards their original positions.  However, given all the practical
constraints which operate in this process of adjustment, it is likely to take a very long
time.
Now let us consider the consequences of a neutral shock.  Although there is no
explicit role for aggregate demand shocks in this model, such shocks are equivalent
to equiproportional changes in the wage equation parameters  ( .   Note that we cani
introduce nominal inertia in the wage equation by temporarily fixing the nominal
wage and letting the output price change, thereby generating equiproportional shifts
in  W .   Of course, neutral wage shocks are also captured by equiproportional shiftsi
in  ( .   So in response to these shocks, we find from (3) thati
and keeping the shares  L /L (i = u,s)  constant, we can use (2) to eliminate  W /Wi u s
and obtain 
6(7)
(8)
This implies that the elasticity of unskilled unemployment with respect to skilled
unemployment in response to a neutral shock is given by
where  0  is the absolute elasticity of  f  with respect to  u  (i.e.  0(u) =
- uf′(u)/f(u)).   In order to obtain some idea of the order of magnitude of this
number, note first that we now have a considerable body of evidence that the best
fitting wage equation corresponding to (3) has the constant elasticity (double log)
form.  (See, for example, Oswald, 1986; Nickell, 1987 and Blanchflower and Oswald
1994a, 1994b).  Unfortunately, none of these papers provide us with estimates of the
elasticity of skilled (unskilled) wages with respect to skilled (unskilled)
unemployment.  However, by making use of the British General Household Survey
for the years 1978-1992, we were able to compute these elasticities for these two
groups and we obtained 0.062 for the skilled (those with qualifications) and 0.054 for
the unskilled (those without qualifications).   So we suppose that  0(u ) = 0.062  and4 s
0(u ) = 0.054.  Looking in the next section, sensible average numbers for  u ,u areu s u  
0.03 and 0.09 respectively and we set the elasticity of substitution between skilled and
unskilled labour at  F = 3.0  (this is the average substitution elasticity between blue
and white collar workers in aggregate manufacturing in Table 3.7 of Hamermesh
(1993)).  The formula above then yields
This tells us that if we have a neutral adverse shock, we may expect the unskilled
unemployment rate to rise by around four fifths of the skilled unemployment rate.5
This shift is illustrated in Figure 3.  Since the question of how skilled and unskilled
unemployment rates move in response to neutral shocks is such a vital one, we
pursue this further by looking briefly at the structure of unemployment by skill in
practice.
Two facts are particularly relevant.  First, it appears that the variation in
unemployment rates across skill levels is mainly due to variations in entry rates as
opposed to mean durations (see Table 1).  Second, the secular trends in
7unemployment over the last two decades correspond, in most countries, to relatively
stable inflow rates and sharply increasing durations.  This suggests that neutral
shocks, will, in the long run, tend to raise unemployment durations across the board
and unemployment rates across skill groups will rise near to equiproportionately.
To summarise, therefore, we can expect changes in the relative demand for
skills to shift relative unemployment rates in the short-term and indeed in the
longer-term if skill supplies do not adjust.  Relative wage rates will tend to shift in
the opposite direction and, in so far as there are rigidities which limit relative wage
adjustments, the impact on relative unemployment rates will be even bigger.  Neutral
shocks will tend to move unskilled rates by somewhat less than skilled rates.  As a
consequence, if falls in the relative demand for skills are important in practice, we
should expect to see a rise in the unskilled unemployment rate and a fall in the
skilled unemployment rate, with these changes being superimposed on the rises in
both rates generated by adverse neutral shocks of the kind described above.  So if we
see a rise in the unskilled rate which is proportionately greater than the rise in the
skilled rate, this implies that the relative decline in the demand for unskilled workers
has played a significant role.  So in the next section we shall look at relative
unemployment rates across the OECD to see what has happened.
2.  Unemployment and Wages by Skill
Our aim in this section is to try and elicit just how important the decline in the
relative demand for the unskilled has been in explaining the increase in OECD
unemployment in the last two decades.  Recall that we are looking for an increase in
the relative unemployment rate of the unskilled and a fall in their relative wages.
Furthermore, if this is to have been a significant factor in the overall increase in the
unemployment rate, then we must expect most of the increase in unemployment to
be concentrated among the unskilled, as Juhn et al. (1991) argue has occurred in the
United States.
8Relative Unemployment Rates
The data on which we focus are the unemployment rates for men in different
education groups.  We concentrate on men because measured women's
unemployment often depends crucially on unemployment benefit and other rules
which change from time to time, thereby corrupting intertemporal comparisons.
Sometimes we have to replace the education grouping by an occupational breakdown
because the former is unavailable.  However, the occupational breakdown is less
satisfactory because the notion of an occupational unemployment rate is less clear cut.
The numerator of such a rate refers to those unemployed whose last job was in
relevant occupation group.  But these individuals are not restricted to searching for
work within this group and may well search in other groups, particularly at a lower
level.  Consequently, the allocation of unemployed individuals across occupation
groups is, to some degree, arbitrary.  This problem does not, of course, occur with
education groupings.
Our basic unemployment data are presented in Table 2 and Figure 4 with the
relevant wage data appearing in Tables 3 and 4.  The following broad brush facts
emerge clearly.  First, for most countries where the data are available, the relative
unemployment rate of the low education group has risen from the 1970s to the 1980s.
Second, during the recent recession, the relative unemployment rate of the low
education group has fallen substantially in the vast majority of countries.  Third, only
in Britain and the United States have there been dramatic falls in the relative wages
of the unskilled during the 1980s although there has been a significant small decline
in Germany.  In some other countries there have been slight shifts in relative wages
over this period and there are no countries where the relative wages of the less
educated have risen in this period except the Netherlands.  Overall, therefore, there
is some evidence that from the 1970s to the 1980s, the fall in the relative demand for
unskilled workers has had the expected impact on unemployment rates.  However,
there seems to be no evidence that the unemployment rate effects are any more
severe in countries where the wage effects are minimal or perverse (i.e. where there
is apparent wage rigidity).
9The Impact of Unskilled Unemployment on the Overall Unemployment Rate
The next step is to see the extent to which overall increases in unemployment
are concentrated on the unskilled or low educated.  Here we focus on the change
from the early (if available) or mid 1970s to the middle or late 1980s.  We can divide
the countries where the data are available into two groups.  In the first group, most
of the unemployment increase is concentrated on the unskilled.  In the second group,
the rise in unemployment has involved a substantial increase in high education
unemployment as well as in low education employment.  The key results are in Table
5.  The first group of countries consist of the United States, Japan, Norway and
Sweden and what they have in common is that the total rise in unemployment to be
accounted for is small in terms of percentage points (successively 1.4, 1.6, 2.7, 0.6).
The second group of countries contains Germany, Netherlands, Spain, UK and
Canada.  In this group, the total rise in unemployment to be accounted for is more
substantial in terms of percentage points (successively 3.7, 7.3, 9.2, 4.6, 3.9) and, in
each case, the proportionate rise in high education unemployment is also significant
although generally somewhat smaller than the proportionate rise in low education
unemployment.  So we can conclude that, when looking at the rise in unemployment
from the 1970s to the 1980s, there is a group of countries (two non-EU European, two
non-European) where the rise in unemployment is small and mostly due to the rise
in low skill unemployment.  Then there is a larger group of countries (four EU
European, one non-European) where there was a substantial increase in
unemployment, a considerable part of which appears to consist of increases in
unemployment rates across skill groups arising from neutral shocks with a smaller
part being due to excess unemployment among the unskilled.
Turning to the subsequent further rise in unemployment in the sharp recession
of the early 1990s, in all countries except Japan we see substantial increases in skilled
unemployment (often relative to unskilled unemployment) suggesting that this latest
episode was neutral or even biased towards the higher skill group.
Unemployment versus Non-Employment
It may be that we are getting a false impression by focusing on unemployment
rates, because it is possible that the unskilled have been leaving the labour force in
10
increasing numbers because of their inability to find work.  Thus, the hypothesis is
that if we look at non-employment rates (i.e. include non-participants who are neither
employed nor looking for work and add them to the unemployed job-seekers) we
shall find a different picture with bigger increases in the relative non-employment
rates of the unskilled from the 1970s to the 1980s.
In Table 6, we present the data for the UK and the US, including unemployment
rates for comparison purposes and restricting ourselves to the over 25s to remove
problems with changes in higher education.  The upshot is plain from the numbers
in Table 6.  The pattern of non-employment rates is very similar to the pattern of
unemployment rates.  In particular, in the UK, we see that the high education
non-employment rate more than doubles from the early 70s to the late 80s.  Just to
check that it is not simply due to an increase in early retirement by those on
occupational pensions, we repeat the exercise in Table 7 for the UK under 55s.  While
the numbers are lower, the pattern remains the same with the percentage of skilled
non-employed rising by a factor of over two and a half from the early 70s to the mid
to late 80s.
As an aside, it is interesting to ask why we have all these new prime age male
non-participants.  In fact, the biggest category of increase in both UK and US is in the
number of men suffering from illness or disability (see Yellen (1991), Table 1, for the
US).  In Table 8a, we set out the number of male disability pensioners of working age
over the last two decades in the UK, and we see a continuing increase which over the
whole 20 year period represents over 4 per cent of the labour force.  Furthermore,
there is no evidence that the increase has been particularly rapid during recessions,
indeed the small boom of the late 70s and the large boom of the late 80s show some
of the biggest increases.  In Table 8b, we use an alternative data source (GHS) which
uses self-reported information and confirms the overall picture.  Why there has been
this increase is not clear, but one element is, presumably, that it has become easier
to obtain invalidity benefit.  This, at any event, is the implication of the UK National
Audit Office Report in 1989 on the subject.6
Returning to our main theme, we may, in summary, conclude that there is no
evidence that looking at non-employment as opposed to unemployment has any
impact on the conclusions of the previous section.   In particular, it remains true that7
11
(9)
(10)
in those countries where unemployment increased significantly in the 1980s, a
substantial part of that increase was due to neutral shocks across skill groups and
could not, therefore, be attributed to the fall in the relative demand for unskilled
workers.  However, it is difficult to say precisely how much of the rise can be so
attributed but we can try and obtain some rough orders of magnitude.
How Much of the Rise in Unemployment is due to the Fall in Unskilled Demand?
It is clear that in the first group of countries displayed in Table 5, most of the
unemployment increase from the 70s to the 80s is due to a fall in the demand for
unskilled workers.  The second group is more interesting, however, because the
overall rise in unemployment is substantial in terms of percentage points.  Taking the
average over all five countries, we find that over the periods specified in Table 5, the
skilled unemployment rate rose from 2.44 to 4.96 per cent (103.3 per cent), the
unskilled unemployment rate rose from 5.54 to 14.22 per cent (156.7 per cent) and the
total unemployment rate rose from 4.68 to 10.42 per cent (122.6 per cent).  In order
to allocate these changes between relative demand shifts and neutral shocks, we may
first note from equations (1), (2), (3) that a relative demand shift corresponds to
d" = - d" = d" > 0  and a neutral shock has the form  d ln ( = d ln ( = d ln ( > 0.s u s u 
But we must also take account of the shifts in the supplies of skilled and unskilled
workers over the relevant period.  So taking differentials of (2), (3) and solving out,
we find that the relative demand shift,  d",  satisfies8
where  n(u) = 1/F(1-u) + 0(u)/u.  Having computed  d",  we can then work out the
unemployment changes which would have come about as a consequence of the
relative demand shift alone.  Setting  d ln ( = 0  in the differentials of (2) and (3)i 
yields
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In order to obtain numerical estimates, we require some parameter values.  In
Section 1, p. 8, we have already provided estimates of  0(u ) = 0.062,  0(u ) = 0.054,s u
F = 3.   The average values of unemployment given above are  u = 0.037  and  u =s u 
0.099.   Our data also reveal that over the relevant period, the average shares of
skilled and unskilled are 14.5 per cent and 37.3 per cent respectively.  Furthermore,
the proportional changes in these shares are 0.65 and -0.66 respectively.  Finally, from
equation (2), we have that  " /" = (W /W )((1-u )L /(1-u )L ) .   Assuming  W /Wu s u s u u s s u s
1/F
 0.66  from Table 3 and using information on unemployment and skill shares, we
calculate that  " /" = 0.8845.  Using (9) and (10) then reveals that the relativeu s 
demand shock alone raises unskilled unemployment by 2.95 percentage points and
reduces skilled unemployment by 0.07 percentage points.  Since the unskilled
represent 37.3 per cent of the labour force and the skilled represent 14.5 per cent
(with the middle group remaining unaffected by the relative demand shift), this
reflects an overall unemployment increase which is about 19 per cent of the total
increase of 5.74 percentage points.  The remaining 81 per cent is, therefore, down to
neutral shocks.
To summarise, it seems likely that for the second group of countries in Table
5, somewhere around 10 to 25 per cent of the increase in unemployment from the
1970s to the 1980s could have arisen from the collapse in demand for the unskilled.
Since this is obviously a rough and ready guesstimate, in the next section we consider
this question for Britain in more detail.
The Impact of the Decline in Demand for Unskilled Workers on Long Run
Unemployment in Britain
The main problems with attempting to measure the effect of the collapse in
demand for the unskilled on overall unemployment is finding variables which
accurately capture changes in the excess demand for labour by skill.  In Britain, the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) collects, from a large number of companies,
answers to the questions (i) Is a shortage of skilled labour likely to limit your output
over the next four months? and (ii) Is a shortage of other labour likely to limit your
output over the next four months?  As a measure of the relative excess demand for
skilled labour (Skill), we simply take the percentage of firms saying yes to (i) divided
13
by the percentage saying yes to (ii).  In Table 9, we report this variable and the
aggregate level of unemployment, for comparison.  
Three points are clear.  First, while the skill variable fluctuates a lot, its level has
risen substantially over the last three decades, particularly from the boom years
before the first oil shock to the boom years of the late 80s.  Second, relative skill
shortages tend to hit their cyclical peak when the economy is emerging from a slump
(i.e. late 70s, mid 80s), for the demand for skilled labour then appears to pick up
sharply whereas that for unskilled labour appears to be more sluggish.  Third, in the
recession of the early 1990s and its aftermath, skill shortages seem less severe than
in the early 1980s, confirming the general pattern we observed in relative
unemployment rates.  As a consequence of these points, we might expect some
positive long run relationship between unemployment and relative skill shortages but
the short-run dynamics are likely to be complicated.
In order to investigate the contribution of relative skill shortages to the shifts
in long-run equilibrium unemployment, we simply investigate the long-run empirical
relationship between unemployment and the supply-side variables which we would
expect to influence it over the longer term.  As well as the skill variable, we follow
the analysis in Layard et al. (1991) (ch. 9) by considering a terms of trade variable (TT
= log real import prices weighted by the import share), union power variable (UP =
log union/nonunion wage mark-up), the benefit replacement ratio (RR = log benefits
to net income ratio), the tax wedge (T = t + t + t , t = payroll tax rate, t = income1 2 3 1 2 
tax rate, t = excise tax rate), an index of employment turbulence (IT).   Note that if3 
9
taxes tend to be borne by labour in the long run, as we suggested in our introduction,
we should find that the tax wedge,  T,  has no significant long run effect on
unemployment.
In order to investigate the long-run effects of these variables on unemployment,
we focus simply on long-run cointegrating relationships.  Of the above variables, all
are I(1) (including log unemployment) with the exception of industrial turbulence
(IT)  which, not surprisingly, is stationary.   Of course, the existence of an apparent10
unit root in some of these series is a `local' result.  For example, unemployment
appears to have a unit root over this particular period despite the fact that it certainly
does not have a unit root over the long haul.  Thus, during the period 1850-1990 it
14
exhibits no trend whatever.  This is not to say that it is stationary, for it exhibits
apparent mean shifts from time to time.
We use two methods to compute a long-run relationship between log u and the
supply side variables.  First we use the standard Johansen (1988) multivariate
procedure and second we estimate an unrestricted dynamic regression with log u as
the dependent variable (five lags on all variables) and take the long-run solution.  The
former method enables us to investigate the extent of cointegration whereas the latter
is a simple method which eliminates the substantial small sample biases inherent in
the static regression method recommended in the original presentation by Engle and
Granger (1987) (see Banerjee et al. 1986, 1993 for a discussion of these).
The Johansen cointegrating vector (the eigenvalue tests reveal there is only one),
normalised on log u, gives 
log u = 26.7TT + 0.059Skill + 0.76T + 8.95RR
+ 2.14UP (+ constant).     1964(4)-1992(4)
and the long-run solution of general dynamic model is
log u = - 35.7 + 17.99TT + 0.108Skill + 1.60T
(4.51) (0.042) (1.39)
+ 4.88RR + 1.94UP + 0.22IT
(1.73) (1.26) (0.22)
(standard errors in parentheses).     1964(4)-1992(4).
Several points are worth noting.  First, the tax wedge effect is not significantly
different from zero, which is consistent with the hypothesis that these taxes fall on
labour in the long run.  Second, (log) unemployment is cointegrated with the
available supply side variables, confirming the results reported in Nickell (1988).  Of
course, unemployment will also be cointegrated with a set of demand variables more
or less by definition (combine demand = output, and the production function).  We
make this remark because it is sometimes mistakenly supposed that this fact is
evidence against the natural rate hypothesis.   Third, the skill effect is both11
statistically and numerically significant.
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So what is the overall contribution of the change in relative skill demand to the
rise in unemployment in the long-term?  The answer is that the skill variable
contributes 0.42 percentage points to the 2.25 percentage point increase in  u  from
the 60s to the 70s (19 per cent) and 1.42 percentage points to the 6.6 percentage point
increase in  u  from the 70s to the 80s (21.5 per cent).  So our estimate is that in
Britain, the decline in the relative demand for unskilled workers has contributed
around 20 per cent of the long-run increase in unemployment up to the 1980s.  This
looks quite consistent with the numbers for Britain reported in Table 5 and the
overall estimates presented in the previous section.
Having ascertained the facts to the best of our ability, it simply remains for us
to discuss the policy of cutting payroll taxes on the unskilled or, equivalently,
subsidising their employment.  This is the topic of the final section.
3.  Should Payroll taxes on the Unskilled be Cut?
Here, we shall address a number of questions.  First, what are the aims of
cutting payroll taxes on, or providing job subsidies for, the unskilled?  Second, are
these aims going to be fulfilled?  Finally, is this policy going to have a significant
impact on overall unemployment?  Before plunging in, two points are worth noting.
First, even if unemployment rises solely as a result of neutral shocks, the position of
the unskilled is seriously worsened because their absolute rise in unemployment is
so great.  Second, we should point out that much of our discussion here is based on
already published work, notably Layard et al. (1991) (Ch. 6) and, more especially, the
analysis in Wood (1994) (Ch. 10) which could hardly be bettered.
The basic idea behind cutting payroll taxes or providing job subsidies for the
unskilled is to raise the demand for unskilled labour.  This will, potentially, reduce
unskilled unemployment, raise unskilled take-home pay and contribute towards an
overall reduction in unemployment.  If this can be achieved, it is good on efficiency
grounds (although, of course, taxes have to rise elsewhere, generating efficiency costs)
and, furthermore, it is good on social grounds.  There are strong social reasons for
raising both living standards and employment opportunities among the unskilled in
a world where, for example, one quarter of prime age men in this category are
currently not working (see Table 7) compared with around 5 per cent a mere 20 years
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ago.  The social problems exacerbated by this level of non-employment are numerous
and very costly, so they provide an independent reason for trying to generate more
unskilled jobs.
So is cutting payroll taxes or providing job subsidies for the unskilled going to
work?  Given the following two propositions, the outlook does not, at first sight, look
very hopeful.
 (i)  If there are no barriers to the acquisition of training, shifts in the demand
for unskilled relative to skilled workers may have little long-run impact on relative
unemployment rates because changes in unemployment rates and wages will tend
to be offset by `migration' from the unskilled to the skilled.
(ii)  In the long run, if wages are flexible, payroll taxes are borne by labour.  So
labour costs and employment are unaffected although take-home pay will change.
The first proposition (see Section 1) seems to suggest that there is not much
point in doing anything.  Indeed cutting payroll taxes on the unskilled may mean
fewer people training for skilled work with wages and unemployment rates little
affected.  But, we may safely argue that barriers to the acquisition of training are
extensive enough to ensure that (i) simply does not apply.  However, then we run
into (ii) (see Introduction) which indicates that payroll tax cuts will not influence
unemployment other than via the roundabout route of raising take-home pay and
hence reducing the benefit replacement rate or, more generally, the ratio of
non-labour income to labour income (post-tax).  The argument we must make here
is that wages at the low end are not flexible because of the wage floor generated by
minimum wage laws, unions or the benefit system.  This fact ensures that payroll
taxes are not wholly borne by labour at the bottom end of the pay distribution.  Thus,
when payroll taxes are imposed, wages at the bottom end cannot fall because of the
minimum wage, say, and unemployment goes up instead.  This ensures that moving
in the opposite direction with payroll tax cuts and job subsidies may have a
significant long-run employment effect as well as some positive impact on take-home
pay.   The overall effect will, however, reduce the incentive for the unskilled to12
acquire training.
Finally, what role should this policy play in a concerted effort to cut overall
unemployment?  At the outset, it is worth noting that it is not possible for us to give
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a full answer to this question, because we are not in a position to compare this policy
with other ways of spending the money either on the unskilled (e.g. subsidised
training, public sector job creation) or more generally (e.g. reforming the benefit
system, active labour market policy).  However, several points can be made.  First,
even if we could completely reverse the impact of the decline in the relative demand
for the unskilled, we would only reduce overall unemployment by a relatively small,
albeit significant amount.  This is because the majority of the increase in
unemployment has been the consequence of factors which have operated neutrally
with regard to skill (in those countries where unemployment has risen substantially).
Second, we must be careful not to reduce significantly the incentive to acquire skills.
This may require some additional policy on the training front.  Third, the social
problems which have arisen not only from the collapse in the relative demand for the
unskilled but also from the substantial rise in overall unemployment remain a crucial
issue, particularly as they seem to be getting worse.  These require special attention
based on an analysis which goes far beyond just unemployment questions.
Overall, therefore, we can argue that cuts in payroll taxes or job subsidies for
the unskilled cannot be expected to play a major role in reversing the inexorable rise
in aggregate unemployment.  But they could make a contribution.  Finally however
it is worth emphasizing that the parlous position of the unskilled in an era of high
unemployment is producing a slew of social problems which are becoming one of the
most intractable issues facing the developed world.  This makes an overall reduction
in unemployment and, thereby, an improvement in the position of the unskilled, a
matter of urgency.
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ENDNOTES
1. See OECD (1994), p. 46.
2. There is also a lot of time series evidence on the question of the incidence of
various taxes.  Indeed every time series wage equation in existence contains explicit
or implicit estimates of the incidence of both employment and excise tax rates.  In fact
many wage equations imply very large effects of taxes on labour costs simply because
relevant tax effects are omitted entirely.  However, from those studies which take tax
effects seriously, the evidence is very mixed.  For example, Knoester and van der
Windt (1987) report large long-run effects of employee taxes on labour costs for 10
OECD countries.  Furthermore, Calmfors (1990), Table 3, reports long-run payroll tax
effects in all Nordic countries except Finland.  However, Bean et al. (1986) only find
significant tax effects in 5 out of 15 OECD countries.
There are three basic problems.  First, the time series results in this area tend
to be very fragile.  Second, short time series find it very hard to discriminate between
fairly long-lasting temporary effects and permanent long-run effects.  And finally,
many macro-models are constructed with little care or thought given to tax effects
and how they feed through into the long-run real equilibrium of the economy.
The consequence of this last point is that if one feeds various tax changes into
macro models, one often finds that they have dramatic long-run effects on
employment and output, not via their aggregate demand effects but because of their
impact on wages.  Generally, these effects should not be taken seriously because of
the strong cross-section evidence that the pattern of employment, income and excise
taxes does not make a significant difference to employment rates in the long run.
3. This is not true in countries without unemployment benefit systems.  In many such
countries, measured unemployment rates are higher for the well-educated, essentially
because the uneducated cannot afford to be unemployed (for example, Bhalotra, 1993,
for India, and Table 2 below for Italy).
4. The elasticities were computed as follows.  First we split the General Household
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Survey male sample into two groups, those without qualifications and those with
qualifications.  Then, within each sample we ran a cross section regression for each
year (1978-92) explaining ln wages by age, age , sic code, part-time dummy, race2
dummy, marital status dummy and 11 region dummies.  We then took the fitted
value for a standardised individual for each region.  Using these standardised wages
for each region along with regional unemployment rates for the two education
groups, we ran separate ln wage, ln unemployment pooled regressions over the
period 1978-92 with time dummies and region dummies.  The reported elasticities are
the absolute coefficients on ln unemployment in the two regressions.
5. It is natural to ask how a shock which leads initially to equiproportional rises in
wage rates and equiproportional falls in employment rates (and hence equal
percentage point rises in unemployment rates), can lead eventually to rises in
unemployment which are getting on for equiproportional.  What happens is that the
initial rise in skilled unemployment is proportionally much greater than the initial
rise in unskilled unemployment.  The constant elasticity form of the wage equation
then induces a much greater second round fall in skilled wages relative to unskilled
wages and hence a much larger second round rise in skilled employment relative to
unskilled employment, particularly as demand is highly elastic.  The final outcome
is then as described in equation (8).
6. See, in particular, some of the comments on pages 2 and 3 of National Audit Office
(1989).
7. Another point worth raising is the possibility that we might get a different picture
if we focused not on the unemployment rates of particular education or skill groups,
but on certain percentiles of the skill distribution.  The argument for doing this is that
because of the overall increase in skill levels, the high education groups have, on
average, become bigger and less `skilled', and the low education groups have become
smaller and less `skilled', thereby raising unemployment rates in both groups.
Looking carefully at the available data indicates that taking account of this does not
appear to change the overall pattern of our findings.
20
8. Eliminating  W between (2), (3) and taking differentials yieldsi  
(1/F(1-u ) + 0(u )/u )du = d"/" + d ln ( + dln(L /L)u u u u u u
(1/F(1-u ) + 0(u )/u )du = - d"/" + d ln ( + 1/F dln(L /L)s s s s s s
Eliminating  d ln (  gives equation (9) in the text and setting  d ln ( = 0  gives
equation (10).
9. TT = s ln(P /P ),  s = imports/GDP (ETAS).   P = import price index for the UKm m 
*
(ETAS),  P = unit value index of world manufacturing exports from UN Monthly* 
Bulletin of Statistics converted from dollars to pounds using the exchange rate
(ETAS).   UP = log(union/non-union mark-up).  This is estimated using the method
described in Layard et al. (1978).   RR = benefit replacement ratio from Social Security
Statistics, Table H3.10, using a weighted average of different family types.   T = t +1 
t + t .   t = employment `tax' borne by the firm = ln (total labour costs per unit of2 3 1 
output/wages and salaries per unit of output);  t = direct tax rate = (DT + SS)/HCR,2 
DT = direct taxes on household income,  SS = households' contributions to social
security schemes,  HCR = households' current receipts less employer contributions
to social security schemes from OECD National Accounts;  t = indirect tax rate =3 
ln(GDP deflator at market prices/GDP deflator at factor cost).   IT = industrial
turbulence = absolute annual change in the proportion of employees in production
industries (BLSHA, YB, DEG).   BLSHA = British Labour Statistics, Historical
Abstract,  DEG = Department of Employment Gazette,  ETAS = Economic Trends
Annual Supplement,  YB = British Labour Statistics Year Book (published annually
from 1969-1976).
10. The data are quarterly from 1963-92.  Unit root tests are as follows:  variable
(DF, ADF(4)),  log u (-.71, -1.31),  ) log u (-5.39 , -3.97 ), TT (-.93, .22),  )T (-13.6 ,* * *
-4.7 ),  UP (-1.26, -1.46),  )UP (-4.06 , -3.58 ),  RR(-.16, -1.93),  )RR (-3.32 , -2.66),  T* * * *
(-2.34, -2.33),  )T (-13.5 , -4.2 ),  OIL (-1.19, -1.48),  )OIL (-8.84 , -4.66 ),  IT (-3.01 ,* * * * *
-3.41 ),  Skill (-1.49, -3.32 ),  )Skill (-4.81 , -5.71 ).   DF is the Dickey-Fuller  t  statistic* * * *
with a constant in the model.   ADF (4) is the Augmented  DF  t  statistic with a
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constant and four lags.  means significant at the 5 per cent level.*  
11. Consider the simple log-linear natural rate model:
(i) y = m - p demand (y = output, m = money stock
p = prices)
(ii) y = a n production (n = employment)1
(iii) y = a R full utilization output (y= full utilization outputG G1
 R = labour force)
(iv) p = w + $ + $ (y-y) - $ (p-p ) + z   prices (w = wages, z = 0 1 2 p p
G e
exogenous 
shifts in price behaviour)
(v) w = p + ( - ( log u - ( (p-p ) + z wages (z = exogenous wage0 1 2 w w
e
pressure)
(ii), (iii) imply  y - y = - a u (u = R - n)  and hence unemployment will beG 1
cointegrated with demand.  However (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) imply that  $ a u + ( log1 1 1 
u = ($ +( ) + (z +z ) + ($ +( )(p-p ).   Since  (p-p )  is  I(0)  and in practice,  $ tends0 0 p w 2 2 1  
e e
to be very small (and UK wage equations tend to be based on log u), this equation
implies that log u will be cointegrated with the supply-side variables  z ,z .p w
12. Note that with a pay floor, payroll tax cuts have different effects from income
tax cuts which have no effect on labour costs and hence on employment.  With
flexible pay, of course, payroll tax cuts have exactly the same effect as income tax
cuts.
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TABLE 1
Unemployment by Occupation:  Inflow and Duration, US and Britain
US (1987) Britain (1984)
_________________________________       ___________________________
Inflow rate Duration Inflow rate Duration
  (% per mo.)  (mos.) u(%) (% per mo.)   (mos.) u(%)
Professional and 0.74 3.0 2.3 0.50 11.2 5.3
Managerial
Clerical 0.88 10.1 8.0
1.58 2.6 4.3
Other non-manual 1.14 11.8 12.2
Skilled manual 1.97 2.9 6.1 1.02 14.2 12.6
Personal service 2.96 2.4 7.7
1.32 14.1 15.5
Other manual 2.84 3.0 9.4
All 2.23 2.6 6.2 0.94 12.8 10.8
Source:  (Layard et al. 1991, chapter 6, Table 3).
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TABLE 2
Male Unemployment Rates by Education or Occupation
1971-74 1975-78 1979-82 1983-86 1987-90 1991 1992 1993
FR Total 5.2 6.7 7.2 7.0 7.9 9.4a b
High ed. 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.9 5.9a b
Low ed. 6.5 9.0 10.8 10.6 12.1 13.6a b
Ratio 3.1 3.6 4.1 3.8 3.1 2.3
GE Total 3.1 3.8 7.6 6.8 5.4
High occ. 1.6 1.6 3.0 2.9 2.4e
Low occ. 3.1 4.5 8.8 7.6 6.2c
Ratio 1.9 2.8 2.9 2.6 2.6c
IT Total 1.8 4.7d e
High ed. 3.4 4.6d e
Low ed. 1.6 4.7d e
Ratio 0.47 1.02d e
Total 7.1 7.9 7.5 8.1
High ed. 8.5 8.4 8.1 8.6
Low ed. 4.4 5.9 5.4 5.6
Ratio 0.52 0.70 0.67 0.64
Total (M+F) 7.2 8.2 10.5 11.8 10.9 11.5
High ed. 12.3 12.2 13.1 13.1 12.2 12.8
Low ed. 4.4 4.8 6.4 8.1 7.3 7.7
Ratio 0.36 0.39 0.49 0.62 0.60 0.60
NE Total 4.4 5.4 11.7f g h
High ed. 2.1 2.4 4.6f g h
Low ed. 4.7 6.8 16.9f g h
Ratio 2.2 2.8 3.7f g h
Total (M+F) 5.5 7.1 13.2 6.9 6.5 6.5 7.5f g h i
High ed. 2.9 3.4 6.2 5.2 4.6 5.1 5.4f g h i
Low ed. 5.7 8.3 18.0 9.9 9.5 9.3 10.9f g h i
Ratio 2.0 2.4 2.9 1.9 2.1 1.8 2.0f g h i
SP Total 6.1 11.7 18.5 15.3 12.8 14.5 17.9
High ed. 4.5 7.9 11.0 8.8 7.3 8.9 10.7j
Low ed. 7.7 13.5 21.4 17.7 16.7 19.2 24.0j
Ratio 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.2j
continued......
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
1971-74 1975-78 1979-82 1983-86 1987-90 1991 1992 1993
UK Total    2.9   4.4   7.7  10.5   7.5 10.0 11.5k
     High ed.  1.4   2.0   3.9   4.7   4.0   5.7   6.6k
     Low ed.   4.0   6.4 12.2  18.2 13.5 17.4 16.9k
     Ratio    2.9   3.2   3.1   3.9   3.4   3.1   2.6k
AL Total 6.8 9.8 7.9 9.5 11.5 12.1
High ed. 3.5 4.4 3.9 4.8 5.9 6.2
Low ed. 8.3 12.2 10.0 11.7 14.2 14.8
Ratio 2.4 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4
NZ Total 5.4 8.4 10.6 10.1
High ed. 2.2 4.8 6.6 6.5
Low ed. 8.8 14.2 17.6 17.0
Ratio 4.0 3.0 2.7 2.6
CA Total 6.9 6.6 10.3 7.8 10.8 12.0 11.7l m
High ed. 2.6 2.4 4.3 3.4 4.5 5.6 5.3l m
Low ed. 8.2 8.3 12.5 11.3 15.4 16.3 16.6l m
Ratio 3.2 3.5 2.9 3.3 3.4 2.9 3.1l m
US Total 3.6 5.5 5.7 7.3 5.0 5.8
High ed. 1.7 2.2 2.1 2.7 2.1 2.8
Low ed. 5.3 8.6 9.4 12.8 9.8 11.0
Ratio 3.1 3.9 4.5 4.7 4.7 3.9
JA Total 1.4 2.4 3.0 2.1n o p
High ed. 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.2n o p
Low ed. 1.6 2.9 4.1 2.6n o p
Ratio 1.3 1.8 2.9 2.2n o p
AUHigh occ. 1.1 1.0 1.3
Low occ. 4.9 3.9 3.7
Ratio 4.5 3.9 2.8
FN Total 6.6 4.6 9.3 15.5q
High ed. 1.6 1.2 3.1 6.3q
Low ed. 8.8 5.9 11.2 18.4q
Ratio 5.5 4.9 3.6 2.9q
NW Total 1.2 1.9 2.1 2.7 3.9 5.5 5.9r
High ed. 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.5 2.3 2.8r
Low ed. 1.9 2.2 2.9 3.8 6.0 8.8 8.9r
Ratio 1.9 2.8 3.2 4.8 4.0 3.8 3.2r
continued......
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
1971-74 1975-78 1979-82 1983-86 1987-90 1991 1992   1993
SW Total    2.8   1.9   2.4    3.1    1.8  3.1  5.6 8.8
     High ed.  1.3   0.8   0.9    1.1    1.0  1.5  2.8 4.2
     Low ed.   3.2   2.4   3.1    4.1    2.4  3.9  6.5    10.4
     Ratio    2.5   4.0   3.4    3.7    2.4  2.6  2.3 2.5
Notes:
FR, France.  Source:  Enquête sur L'Emploi, INSEE (annual publication).  Low
education:  no certification or only primary school certificate.  High education: two
years university education or further education college degree or university degree.
= 1982 only, = 1983, 1986 only.  Data refer to males, aged 15 plus.a b 
GE, (West) Germany.  Source:  ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics (various issues,
Tables 3C, 10C).  Low occupation:  production and related workers, transport
equipment operators and labourers.  High occupation: professional, technical and
related, administrative and managerial workers.  = 1976-78 only.  Data refer toc 
males.
IT, Italy.  Source:  first set, Rilevazione delle forze di lavor, reported in an as yet
unpublished OECD Table (our thanks to John Martin).  Remaining sets, Annuario
Statistico Italiano, ISTAT (our thanks to Barbara Petrongolo and Marco Manacorda).
Low education:  lower secondary or less.  High education:  upper secondary or
higher.  = 1980 only, = 1989 only.  Data refer to males, aged 25-64 except for (M+F)d e 
which refers to males and females.
NE, Netherlands.  Source:  Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, provided for us by
Jan van Ours and Erik Brouwer.  Low education:  basic education or completed
junior secondary school or junior vocational training.  High education:  completed
vocational college or university education.  = 1985, 1977; = 1979, 1981; = 1983,f g h 
1985; = 1990.  Data in the first set refer to males aged 15-64; in the second set (M+F)i 
to males and females aged 15-64.
SP, Spain.  Source:  Spanish Labour Force Survey from the Bank of Spain data base
(our thanks to Juan Dolado).  Low education:  illiterate and without studies or
primary.  High education:  superior (essentially university).   = 1976-78.  Data referj 
to males, aged 16-64.
UK, United Kingdom.  Source:  General Household Survey data tapes.  Low
education:  no qualifications.  High education:  passed A levels (18+ examination) or
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professional qualification or university degree.   = 1973-4.  Data refer to males, agedk 
16-64.
AL, Australia.  Source:  The Labour Force: Educational Attainment, Australia,
Australian Bureau of Statistics.  Low education:  did not attend highest level of
secondary school.  High education:  university degree.  Data refer to males aged
15-69.
NZ, New Zealand.  Source:  Statistics New Zealand (our thanks to Giles Hancock).
Low education:  no qualification.  High education:  School or Post-School
qualification.  Data refer to males, aged 16-64.
CA, Canada.  Source:  The Labour Force, Statistics Canada (various issues).  Low
education:  up to level 8.  High education:  university degree.   = 1979, = 1984-6.l m 
Data refer to males, aged 15+.
US, United States.  Source:  Handbook of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1989 (Table 67).  Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1993 (Table 654).  Low
education:  less than 4 years of high school.  High education:  4 or more years of
college.  Data refer to males aged 25-64.
JA, Japan.  Source:  Employment Status Survey (our thanks to Toshiaki Tachibanaki).
Low education:  junior high school.  High education:  university.   = 1971, 1974; =n o 
1979, 1982; = 1987.  Data refer to males aged 16-64.p 
AU, Austria.  Source:  as Germany.  Low and High occupation as Germany.  Data
refer to males.
FN, Finland.  Source:  Työvoiman Koulutus ja Ammatit, 1984-1992/1993, Statistics
Finland.  Low education:  basic education only.  High education:  higher education
both lower and upper levels.   = 1984-6.  Data refer to males aged 15-74.q 
NW, Norway.  Source:  Labour Market Statistics, Statistik Sentrallyra.  Low education:
primary level.  High education:  university level.   = 1972-4.  Data refer to males andr 
females, aged 16-74.
SW, Sweden.  Source:  Swedish Labour Force Surveys (our thanks to Bertil
Holmlund).   Low education:  pre-upper secondary school up to 10 years.  High
education:  post-upper secondary education.  Pro-rata adjustments as follows:  post
1986, change in measurement reduced aggregate unemployed by 16 per cent.  Post
1982, change in measurement increased aggregate unemployed by 9 per cent.  Data
refer to males aged 16-64.
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TABLE 3
Earnings Differentials by Education (Males)
                        Ratio of High to Low Education Groups
Early '70s Early '80s Late '80s       
FR 1.66 1.63
GE 1.36 1.42
IT 1.96 1.60 1.61
NE 1.50 1.22
UK 1.64 1.53 1.65
AL 1.89 1.54 1.58
CA 1.65 1.40 1.42
US 1.49 1.37 1.51
JA 1.33 1.26 1.26
SW 1.40 1.16 1.19
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (1993), Table 5.6.  Davis (1992).
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TABLE 4
Earnings Dispersion for Males
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
1973 1975 1979-81 1985-86 1987-88 1989-90 1991
 ))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
FR D9/D5 2.00 2.09 2.05 2.10 2.09 2.11 2.11*
D1/D5 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.66*
D9/D1 3.23 3.43 3.25 3.28 3.17 3.20 3.20*
GE D9/D5 1.47 1.65 1.65 1.65 1.65*
D1/D5 0.67 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.71*
D9/D1 2.19 2.39 2.32 2.29 2.32*
IT D9/D5 1.44 1.51 1.56
D1/D5 0.69 0.73 0.75
D9/D1 2.09 2.07 2.08
UK D9/D5 1.70 1.66 1.72 1.85 1.91 1.96 1.99*
D1/D5 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.59*
D9/D1 2.50 2.37 2.53 2.94 3.08 3.21 3.37*
AL D9/D5 1.50 1.50 1.56 1.55 1.55 1.59
D1/D5 0.75 0.74 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.70
D9/D1 2.00 2.03 2.17 2.18 2.21 2.27
CA  D9/D5 1.67 1.67 1.68 1.71 1.75
D1/D5 0.52 0.48 0.42 0.45 0.44
D9/D1 3.21 3.48 4.00 3.80 3.98
US D9/D5 1.93 1.95 2.09 2.10 2.14
D1/D5 0.41 0.41 0.38 0.38 0.38
D9/D1 4.71 4.76 5.50 5.53 5.63
JA D9/D5 1.63 1.67 1.73
D1/D5 0.63 0.61 0.61
D9/D1 2.59 2.74 2.84
SW D9/D5 1.57 1.68! 1.50 1.56 1.57
D1/D5 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.73
D9/D1 2.07 2.15 1.97 2.05 2.15
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Notes: D9, D5, D1 are upper limits of the deciles of the earnings distribution.  *
implies change in measurement, so not comparable to previous numbers.
OECD Employment Outlook (1993), Table 5.2.
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TABLE 5
Percent Increases in Male Unemployment from the 1970s
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Countries where most of the increase to the
1980s is among the unskilled
US JA NW SWa a a b           
Percent increase Total  39 114 225 22
from early or mid High ed.  24  17 -50 -8
1970s to late 1980s Low ed.  85 156 216 59
Percent increase Total  61  50 392 214
from early or mid High ed.  65   0 180 223
1970s to 1990s peak Low ed. 108  63 378 225
Countries where a significant part of the increase
                               to the 1980s is among the skilled
GE NE SP UK CAc d c a d
Percent increase Total 119 166 151 158  49
from early or mid High ed.  81 119  96 185  65
1970s to late 1980s Low ed. 145 260 129 237  52
Percent increase Total 193 281  74
from early or mid High ed. 137 625 115
1970s to 1990s peak Low ed. 212 336  99
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Notes: Based on Table 2.  = 1987-90/1971-4; = 1983-6/1971-4; = 1987-90/1975-8; =a b c d 
1983-6/1975-8.  We only go to the mid 1980s in SW because unemployment in
the late 1980s is so much lower than in the early 1970s, the numbers are hard
to interpret.  Late 1980s figures for males in NE are not available.
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TABLE 6
UK Male Unemployment and Non-Employment Rates by Education
(Age 25-64)
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
1971-74 1975-78 1979-82 1983-86 1987-90 1991 1992
Unemployment
Total 2.7 3.8 6.9 9.6 7.0 9.0 10.3
High ed. 0.8  1.6  2.9  3.6  3.1 4.7  5.8
Low ed. 3.6 5.0 9.8 15.4 12.1 15.2 15.7
Ratio 4.5 3.1 3.4 4.3 3.9 3.2 2.7
Non-employment
Total 7.9 9.7 14.8 19.9 18.3 20.9 22.6
High ed. 4.0 5.1 6.8  9.1  8.7 11.5 13.4
Low ed. 9.8 12.6 20.3 29.7 29.5 32.7 34.7
Ratio  2.5  2.5  3.0  3.3  3.4 2.8  2.6
US Male Unemployment and Non-Employment Rates by Education
                               (Age 25-64)
1971-74 1975-78 1979-82 1983-86 1987-90 1991
Unemployment
Total 3.6 5.5 5.7 7.3 5.1 5.8
High ed. 1.7 2.2 2.1 2.7 2.1 2.8
Low ed.  5.3  8.6  9.4 12.8  9.8 11.0
Ratio  3.1  3.9  4.5  4.7  4.7 3.9
Non-employment
Total 11.3 15.1 15.6 17.8 15.6 16.3
High ed.  5.6  6.7  6.6  8.0  7.6 8.3
Low ed. 18.0 25.8 28.3 34.0 31.0 32.4
Ratio  3.2  3.9  4.3  4.3  4.1 3.0
))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Source: UK:  General Household Survey data tapes.
US:  As in Table 2.
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TABLE 7
UK Male Unemployment and Non-Employment Rates by Education
(Age 25-55)
               )))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
1971-74 1975-78 1979-82 1983-86 1987-90 1991 1992
Unemployment
Total 2.4 3.7 6.7 9.1 6.6 8.5 10.2
High ed. 0.8  1.5 2.6 3.4 2.9 4.4 5.7
Low ed. 3.4  5.3 10.1 15.6 12.3 15.2 15.7
Ratio 4.3  3.5 3.9 4.6 4.2 3.5 2.8
Non-employment
Total 4.4  6.0 9.7 12.9 11.2 13.9 15.7
High ed. 2.0  3.2 4.4 5.6 5.1 7.5 9.3
Low ed. 5.7  8.3 14.1 21.3 20.3 23.5 25.1
Ratio 2.9  2.6 3.2 3.8 4.0 3.1 2.7
               )))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))
Source:  General Household Survey data tapes.
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TABLE 8
(a)  Males aged 20-64 in Receipt of Invalidity Benefit (in thousands)
1972 322 1980 522 1988 781
1973 341 1981 538 1989 818
1874 349 1982 578 1990 852
1975 352 1983 617 1991 891
1976 437 1984 664 1992 963
1977 452 1985 701
1978 488 1986 722
1979 529 1987 746
Source: UK Social Security Statistics (annual), Table D1.22 (also includes
those in receipt of Severe Disability Allowance, known as
Non-Contributory Invalidity Pension prior to November 1984.
This started in 1976, hence the jump in the series between 1975
and 1976).
(b) Proportion of Males in the Population who are Unable to Work
because of Long-term Sickness or Disability
          Age 25-64 Age 25-55           Age 25-64 Age 25-55
1973 2.1 1.0 1983 4.5 2.2
1974 2.5 1.1 1984 3.9 1.9
1975 2.3 0.9 1985 4.8 2.3
1976 2.4 0.9 1986 4.6 2.4
1977 2.4 1.0 1987 4.4 2.0
1978 2.5 1.2 1988 4.6 2.3
1979 3.1 1.3 1989 4.9 3.1
1980 3.5 1.6 1990 5.2 2.9
1981 3.3 1.7 1991 4.9 2.6
1982 4.2 2.1 1992 5.9 3.5
Source:  General Household Survey Data Tapes.
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TABLE 9
Relative Skill Shortages and Unemployment, 1963-92
Skill  u(%) Skill u(%)
1963-66  2.54  2.63 1979-82  4.30  8.13
1967-70  3.42  3.03 1983-86  8.93 11.63
1971-74  3.85  3.55 1987-90  6.45  7.98
1975-78  5.48  5.55 1991-94  4.51  9.67
Source:  CBI Industrial Trends Survey, Layard et al. (1991) Table A3 and OECD
Employment  Outlook, 1994.  Unemployment is the OECD standardised rate.
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